In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that (...) I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise from myreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation of distinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise. 1. Remembering simple ideas My argument that Humean ideas ofmemory are relative ideas is based primarily on Hume's remarks in three passages. In Treatise 1.1.3, one finds this: "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tytt down in that respect, without any power of variation."1 Later in the same passage one finds this: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9) And in Treatise 1.3.5, one finds this: These faculties [memory and imagination] are as little distinguish'd from each other by the arrangement of their complexideas. For tho'itbe apeculiar propertyofthe memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their Volume XLX Number 1 187 DANIEL E. FLAGE operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85) This is only one characteristic ofideas ofmemory, the other being the greater degree of"force andvivacity" in an idea ofthe memory vis-à-vis an idea ofthe imagination (T 9, 85). I call this characteristic the formal criterion (Flage 1985a, 171); Friedman calls it the external difference (p. 178). These passages show that ideas of the memory represent earlier impressions, or ideas, or "events," or things known.2 How do they do so? Given the remarks on the preservation of"order and form" and "order and position," and given that resemblance alone is not sufficient to distinguish nonmnemonic ideas from mnemonic ideas (see T 9), I argued that there is an implicit causal thesis: an idea ofmemory singles out the impression that was its original cause. It is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description ofthe form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea. (Flage 1985a, 172)3 If my account of memory is correct, there is a positive idea ("mental image") that provides the basis for every relative idea of memory. Further, this positive idea must be complex. Friedman objects (pp. 180-81) that insofar as my account requires that there be a complex positive idea that provides the basis for one's relative idea of memory, this conflicts with several passages in the Treatise. She cites the ink spot experiment (T 42) as showing that one can have a simple impression of colour. She remarks, "Since we can have such a simple impression, we can also remember it" (p. 180), adding, "It seems clear that Hume thinks that in the [ink spot] experiment, all that is present in one's visual field is the spot of ink" (ibid.). Since I had argued that "Hume's example ofseeing a minimum... (shrink)

The attempt to find usable diagrams fornterms of the sort devised by John Venn seems to have originated with Venn himself, who published diagrams for up to five classes (the fifth class, however, was shaped like a doughnut, and contained an area outside itself — like the hole in the doughnut). Venn then suggested that “if we wanted to use a diagram forsixterms (x, y, z, w, v, u) the best plan would probably be to taketwofive-term figures, one for theupart (...) and one for the non-upart of all the other combinations …” Such a method would, as Venn admits, be somewhat confusing to the eye, and thus fail to fulfil one of the major purposes of the diagram; nevertheless, it is a method which could be extended to covernclasses.Venn also suggests (but without illustration) another method for drawing diagrams fornterms: “… the rule of formation would be very simple. We should merely have to begin by drawing any closed figure, and then proceed to draw others subject to the one condition that each intersect once, and once only, all the existing subdivisions produced by those which had gone before.” Then, in a rather surprising footnote, he adds: “It will be found that when we adhere to continuous figures, instead of the discontinuous five-term figure given above, there is a tendency for the resultant outlines thus successively drawn to assume a comb-like shape after the first four or five. If we begin by circles or other rounded figures the teeth are curved, if by parallelograms then they are straight. (shrink)

In Section 38 of the Theory of Vision Vindicated, George Berkeley claims that he had used the method of analysis throughout the Theory of Vision. What does that mean? I first show that "analysis" denoted a fairly well-defined method in the early modern period: it was regularly described as a method of discovery. Then I show that the discussion of distance perception in the Theory of Vision exemplifies the method of analysis and may be seen as a modification of a (...) non-geometrical account of distance vision in Rene Descartes' Optics. (shrink)

Focusing on five increasingly interrelated spheres of professional activity-politics, law, engineering, medicine, and science-the contributors to Professional Ethics and Social Responsibility cast new light on familiar ethical quandaries and direct attention to new areas of concern, particularly the institutional setting of contemporary professional activity.

A crisis of values underlies the economic uncertainty and anxiety about the future of the United States. The author of this book observes the shift of emphasis from productivity to consumption, from contribution to entitlement, and from long-term investment to short-term gain.

Human Rights and the Ethics of Globalization provides a balanced, thoughtful discussion of the globalization of the economy and the ethical considerations inherent in the many changes it has prompted. The book's introduction maps out the philosophical foundations for constructing an ethic of globalization, taking into account both traditional and contemporary sources. These ideals are applied to four specific test cases: the ethics of investing in China, the case study of the Firestone company's presence in Liberia, free-trade and fair-trade issues (...) pertaining to the coffee trade with Ethiopia and the use of low-wage factories in Mexico to serve the US market. The book concludes with a comprehensive discussion of how to enforce global compliance with basic human rights standards, with particular attention to stopping abuses by multinational corporations through litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act. (shrink)

Many of you may be familiar with what is today called the “Gaia hypothesis.” It consists in the thesis that the earth is a super-organism that exhibits specific properties of life: It regulates its own temperature, “excretes” waste, combats poisonous “infections,” and the like. In a word, it maintains homoeostasis. The hypothesis has supposedly been established by using a scientific method: the proposal of a hypothesis putatively based on observation and the reasonable explanation of the data. It was offered ostensibly (...) as the only viable explanation for a vast host of natural phenomena, of which the actual processes and mechanics are not truly understood. I will note just a few of these. (shrink)

The parasitic nematode Ascaris lives in the low‐oxygen intestinal folds of over one billion people world‐wwide. The worm has an octameric hemoglobin that binds oxygen four orders of magnitude more tightly than does human hemogobin. Our studies have focused on elucidating the molecular mechanism of oxygen avidity, the basis of multimerization and the function of this remarkable molecule. We now believe that we understand a fair amount about the molecular interactions that result in enhanced avidity, have some preliminary ideas on (...) octamer formation, and have some hypotheses about possible function. Along the way we have stumbled into the disciplines of intron evolution, sterol biosynthesis and oxygen‐regulated gene expression. (shrink)

Irish philosopher George Bishop Berkeley was one of the greatest philosophers of the early modern period. Along with David Hume and John Locke he is considered one of the fathers of British Empiricism. Berkeley is a clear, concise, and sympathetic introduction to George Berkeley’s philosophy, and a thorough review of his most important texts. Daniel E. Flage explores his works on vision, metaphysics, morality, and economics in an attempt to develop a philosophically plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s oeuvre as whole. (...) Many scholars blur the rejection of material substance with the claim that only minds and things dependent upon minds exist. However Flage shows how, by distinguishing idealism from immaterialism and arguing that Berkeley’s account of what there is is dependent upon what is known, a careful and plausible philosophy emerges. The author sets out the implications of this valuable insight for Berkeley’s moral and economic works, showing how they are a natural outgrowth of his metaphysics, casting new light on the appreciation of these and other lesser-known areas of Berkeley’s thought. Daniel E. Flage’s Berkeley presents the student and general reader with a clear and eminently readable introduction to Berkeley’s works which also challenges standard interpretations of Berkeley’s philosophy. (shrink)

Francisco Pereira, Ver no es creer, Gedisa, México, 2021, 272 pp.

This volume contains eleven essays dealing with the question of how to face the current challenges of globalization. The essays included in this volume were originally presented at the Renvall Institute for Area and Cultural Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, on the occasion of the Sixth World Congress of the International Society for Universal Dialogue (ISUD) Presents Keynote addresses or prize-winning papers from the Congress Central theme explores the need to rethink our concepts of nature, culture, and freedom in an (...) age of increased globalization Topics examined range from global justice, international law, and human rights to ecoterrorism, cultural relativism, and the challenges of autonomy. (shrink)

Most commentators who consider Hegel's treatment of the female principle (Weiblichkeit) in the Phenomenology of Spirit only believe that it refers to "True Spirit" and is limited to a brief discussion of Sophocles's character Antigone. This is not actually true. The paper deals with both with the broader question of who represents the female principle and also goes into detail on the first appearance of Antigone in chapter five and on her final appearance in chapter seven, Reason. The female principle (...) returns in Religion as an aspect of Absolute Being. The female goddesses, especially the mother goddess and the Erinyes, embody this principle. Antigone reappears as offering prophetic wisdom for their mission, which is Divine Law and justice. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the normative moral theory embedded in Hume's works is an act-deontological theory. After providing a conceptual framework for my discussion, I show that in Book III, Part i, Section 1 of the *Treatise* Hume rejected the thesis that there are synthetic a priori constitutive rules of moral obligation. Next I show that the positive evidence indicates that Hume accepted an act-deontological theory of moral value. Since constitutive moral rules need not be synthetic a priori (...) propositions, and since it might be suggested that Hume proposed rules defining moral obligation, I show that the rules Hume proposed were fundamentally rules of nonmoral obligation. I conclude with a brief examination of "Of the Standard of Taste." Since Hume held that ethical and aesthetic theories are on a par, evidence that Hume accepted an act-deontological theory of aesthetic value will tend to confirm my contention that he also accepted an act-deontological theory of moral value. (shrink)